The Origins and Consequences of Affective Polarization in the United States

Main text

1. 1p. 133, Implicit Measures

   Published

   Interestingly, implicit bias is less pronounced than explicit bias as measured through survey questions; 91% of Republicans and 75% of Democrats in the same study explicitly evaluated their party more favorably.

   Correction

   Interestingly, implicit bias is less pronounced than explicit bias as measured through survey questions; in the same study, the difference between Democrats and Republicans was larger on the feeling thermometer (Cohen's d = 1.72) than on the implicit measure (Cohen's d = .95).

   Basis Iyengar & Westwood (2015) do not report the share of each party that rated its own party more favorably. They report the two effect sizes above, and mean net thermometer scores (Republican minus Democratic rating) of −48.84 for Democrats and 42.58 for Republicans, so Democrats were at least as explicitly polarized as Republicans.

2. 2p. 133, Implicit Measures

   Published

   The difference in the D-score—the operational indicator of implicit bias—across the party divide was 0.50, while the corresponding difference in implicit racial bias across the racial divide was only 0.18

   Correction

   The difference in the D-score—the operational indicator of implicit bias—across the party divide was 0.50, while the corresponding difference in implicit racial bias across the racial divide was only 0.25

   Basis Iyengar & Westwood (2015) report mean D-scores of .16 for whites and −.09 for African Americans, a difference of 0.25; their party means (.27 for Republicans, −.23 for Democrats) give the 0.50 printed here. The party divide remains the larger of the two (Cohen's d = .95 for party and .61 for race).

3. 3p. 138, partisanship and economic behavior

   Published

   However, interacting with a copartisan seller nearly doubled the purchasing price of the gift card.

   Correction

   However, a copartisan seller nearly doubled the rate at which people responded to the offer of the gift card, relative to a seller with no stated party ties (a difference that fell just short of conventional statistical significance), while counter-partisan sellers fared no worse than the neutral seller.

   Basis In McConnell et al. (2018) the price was fixed: every participant was offered a $50 gift card for $25. The response rate was 2.1% in the control condition, 3.9% with a copartisan seller (p = .07) and 2.2% with a counter-partisan seller (Table 2, column 1).

4. 4p. 139

   Published

   Given the concerns over the motives of survey respondents, scholars have used research designs less subject to partisan cheerleading. For instance, Gerber & Huber (2010) find that when party control of Congress switches, consumer behavior changes, and it changes along party lines, in anticipation of changes in the economy. After the Democrats took over Congress in 2006, strong Democrats showed a 12.8% increase in holiday spending and a 30.5% increase in vacation spending relative to strong Republicans. In an earlier study, Gerber & Huber (2009) used data from county tax receipts to estimate that a county that moves from 50% Democratic to 65% Democratic undergoes an increase in consumption 0.9% higher following a Democratic presidential victory compared with a Republican presidential victory.

   Correction

   Given the concerns over the motives of survey respondents, scholars have used research designs less subject to partisan cheerleading. For instance, Gerber & Huber (2009) used data from county tax receipts to estimate that a county that moves from 50% Democratic to 65% Democratic undergoes an increase in consumption 0.9% higher following a Democratic presidential victory compared with a Republican presidential victory. In a panel survey, Gerber & Huber (2010) find that when party control of Congress switches, economic expectations and spending intentions change along party lines: after the Democrats took over Congress in 2006, strong Democrats reported plans for a 12.8% increase in holiday spending and a 30.5% increase in vacation spending relative to strong Republicans.

   Basis Gerber & Huber (2010) used a panel survey around the November 2006 election to measure changes in economic expectations and behavioral intentions, so their results are self-reports. The evidence on actual consumption is the county tax-receipt study, Gerber & Huber (2009). The sentence that follows (“However, these empirical results have recently been challenged (McGrath 2017)”) is unchanged.

5. 5p. 144, Literature Cited

   Published

   Hersh ED, Ghitza Y. 2019. Mixed-partisan households and electoral participation in the United States. PLOS ONE 13:e0203997 Hersh ED, Goldenberg MN. 2016. Democratic and Republican physicians provide different care on politicized health issues. PNAS 114(42):11811–16

   Correction

   Hersh ED, Ghitza Y. 2018. Mixed-partisan households and electoral participation in the United States. PLOS ONE 13(10):e0203997

   Hersh ED, Goldenberg MN. 2016. Democratic and Republican physicians provide different care on politicized health issues. PNAS 113(42):11811–16

   Basis Hersh & Ghitza appeared in PLOS ONE on October 10, 2018 (doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0203997), so the in-text citation in footnote 2 (p. 137) reads Hersh & Ghitza (2018). Hersh & Goldenberg is in PNAS volume 113 (doi:10.1073/pnas.1606609113).

6. 6p. 146, Literature Cited

   Published

   Michelitch K, Utych S. 2018. Electoral cycle fluctuations in partisanship: global evidence from eight-six countries. J. Politics 80(2):412–27 Montagnes BP, Peskowitz Z, McCrain J. 2018. Bounding partisan approval rates under endogenous partisanship: why high presidential partisan approval may not be what it seems. J. Politics 81(1):327–33

   Correction

   Michelitch K, Utych S. 2018. Electoral cycle fluctuations in partisanship: global evidence from eighty-six countries. J. Politics 80(2):412–27

   Montagnes BP, Peskowitz Z, McCrain J. 2019. Bounding partisan approval rates under endogenous partisanship: why high presidential partisan approval may not be what it seems. J. Politics 81(1):321–26

   Basis Montagnes, Peskowitz & McCrain is in the January 2019 issue of the Journal of Politics, pp. 321–326 (doi:10.1086/700572), so the in-text citation on p. 143 reads Montagnes et al. 2019.