The paper
Justin Grimmer, Solomon Messing, and Sean J. Westwood (2012). How Words and Money Cultivate a Personal Vote: The Effect of Legislator Credit Claiming on Constituent Credit Allocation. American Political Science Review 106(4), 703–719.
doi:10.1017/s0003055412000457 (opens in a new tab) · No public replication archive
Main text
pp. 703, 704, 712 and 718, in-text citations
Published
Lazarus and Reiley 2010
Correction
Lazarus and Reilly 2010
Basis The cited article, “The Electoral Benefits of Distributive Spending” (Political Research Quarterly 63(2), 2010), is by Jeffrey Lazarus and Shauna Reilly. The citation appears five times in the text; see also the correction to the reference list on p. 718.
p. 709, text describing Figure 3
Published
a reduction of 4.1 percentage points in the 111th Congress (95 percent confidence interval [0.03, 0.05]). [...] A one-standard deviation shift towards more alignment is associated with a 2.4 percentage point reduction in credit claiming press releases in the 111th Congress (95 percent confidence interval [0.01, 0.04]). Similarly, Congressional leaders allocate less attention to credit claiming than other legislators (5.8 fewer percentage points, [0.01, 0.09]); members of the Appropriations committee allocate more attention to credit claiming (3.9 more percentage points, [0.02, 0.06]); Republicans in the 109th Congress allocate more attention to credit claiming than Democrats (3.3 more percentage points, [0.01, 0.04]); while Democrats in the 111th Congress allocate more attention to credit claiming press releases than Republicans (7.2 more percentage points, [5.6, 8.9]).
Correction
a reduction of 4.1 percentage points in the 111th Congress (95 percent confidence interval [3, 5] percentage points). [...] A one-standard deviation shift towards more alignment is associated with a 2.4 percentage point reduction in credit claiming press releases in the 111th Congress (95 percent confidence interval [1, 4] percentage points). Similarly, Congressional leaders allocate less attention to credit claiming than other legislators (5.8 fewer percentage points, [1.8, 9.8]); members of the Appropriations committee allocate more attention to credit claiming (3.9 more percentage points, [2, 6]); Republicans in the 109th Congress allocate more attention to credit claiming than Democrats (3.3 more percentage points, [1.8, 4.8]); while Democrats in the 111th Congress allocate more attention to credit claiming press releases than Republicans (7.2 more percentage points, [5.6, 8.9]).
Basis The printed intervals for leaders ([0.01, 0.09], midpoint 5.0 points) and for the 109th-Congress party difference ([0.01, 0.04], midpoint 2.5 points) are not centred on their estimates of 5.8 and 3.3 points. The corrected intervals are the ones drawn in Figure 3 (Leader and Democrat rows, 111th and 109th Congress panels), whose midpoints are 5.8 and 3.3 points. The other intervals in the passage are restated in percentage points, the unit of the estimates; their values are unchanged.
p. 718, References
Published
Lazarus, Jeffrey, and Shauna Reiley. 2010. “The Electoral Benefits of Distributive Spending.” Political Research Quarterly 63 (2): 343–55.
Correction
Lazarus, Jeffrey, and Shauna Reilly. 2010. “The Electoral Benefits of Distributive Spending.” Political Research Quarterly 63 (2): 343–55.
Supplementary information
SI section 2.1.1, p. 8, Study 1 credit-claiming stimulus 1
Published
Headline: Representative $LNAME Brings Local Fire Departments $680,000 for Firefighter Safety Summary: A total of $680,000 in grants for operations and safety programs were awarded to local fire departments [...] Full text: A total of $680,000 in grants for operations and safety programs was awarded to local fire departments
Correction
Headline: Representative $LNAME Brings Local Fire Departments $68,763 for Firefighter Safety Summary: A total of $68,763 in grants for operations and safety programs were awarded to local fire departments [...] Full text: A total of $68,763 in grants for operations and safety programs was awarded to local fire departments
Basis Table 1 of the article (p. 711) prints the same Study 1 message with $68,763 (“over $68,000” in its headline). The SI amount is ten times larger.